I really enjoyed Sartre’s claim that freedom never encounters limits, but rather imposes them on itself. This claim in itself is very applicable to explaining the why’s in our daily life and instrumental in reassessing how things are defined. It is our freedom through which we define our obstacles, but it is always before things are encountered. That is, we first draw up the freedom field in which we will operate and be limited, then we assess various situations that arise, such as the crag. Depending on our already defined freedom, we can then understand why the crag posses such a daunting obstacle if we are building a stadium, a neutral existence if we are surveying the land, or an aid if we need a good view to take a picture.
To claim that freedom is entirely limitless and that it only imposes limits on itself is somewhat true, but it needs to be qualified. Freedom needs to be defined before anything else occurs. Just like not making a decision is in fact choosing to not make that decision and thus a choice is made, with every choice, freedom is limited. Any subsequent choice limits freedom more or alters the limit on freedom as much as the previous choices will allow. Thus any “crag” that is encountered after that first choice, where freedom is already limited will be in-itself, either “as resistance or as aid.” Thus, it is impossible to first assess the object, and then impose a limit on freedom, so that the “crag” can be defined as aid, rather than as resistance. For this reason, it is irrelevant that a freedom only has boundaries that it imposes on itself, because there is nothing that can be done to change that freedom that was arbitrarily limited before anything else happened.
However, Sartre’s claim does roughly translate into a great analytical tool. It gives us the insight into why something is occurring and provides a tool to confirm or realize that some fundamental belief needs to be changed, within the parameters of the limited freedom. Thus, the limits that freedom imposes on itself are purely coincidental with absolutely no time or any knowledge at all about future encounters that would make the limits easy to work with in the world. For this reason freedom is limited by its own parameters, but because of random chance, which essentially makes freedom always have boundaries and only before existence exists is it really limitless.
Sunday, October 11, 2009
Hesse
I'm going to completely jump off the Sartre ship. I've been reading Steppenwolf by Hermann Hesse. The "Treatise on the Steppenwolf" (found on page 104 of our book) is amazing; I really encourage reading this to further understand existentialism. Throughout the book Hesse references Nietzsche, whose influence is evident throughout the novel. The main character, Harry Haller, completely distances himself from society, but keeps a close watch and commentary on said 1920s society. "But in the midst of the freedom he had attained Harry suddenly became aware that his freedom was a death and that he stood alone" (108). This is existential to the extreme. Harry mimics Dostoevsky's Underground Man in the way that he is not mentally constrained within society but continues to critique it. The difference between the two is that the Underground Man is angry against the bourgeois society, whereas Harry longs to be a part of it. He longs for the innocence and simplicity of living like the masses. Although he is a lone wolf (a wolf from the Steppes), he wishes to be fully human and experience humanity for all it's stupidity and ignorance.
sartre and others
In his section on “Bad Faith” Sartre gives the three examples to help explain different facets of his point, the woman on a date, the waiter, and the homosexual. The women on the date shows how the women is in bad faith by believing she can transcend the situation she is in by denying the facts of the situation, and by reducing the man’s actions to mere facticity instead of applying meaning to them as well. The example of the waiter illustrates the bad faith of a waiter who is denying the transcendental qualities about himself by trying to fit an specific conception of the waiter, only concerning himself with his facticity. The example of homosexual shows the problems with sincerity, as choosing to be sincere is in Sartre’s view objectifying oneself as a “real” object or label.
The example of the waiter stuck with more than with the other two, and also has given me an excuse to ramble about my own misunderstandings of Sartre. First, I agree with Professor Johnson that it is very easy to see Sartre’s description of what it means to be in “bad faith” played out in everyday interactions with others and in my own thinking. For example, driving back to campus yesterday I had an experience I thought was exactly like Sartre’s waiter example. As a friend skipped through radio stations, one DJ’s voice stood out very clearly. Talking about musicals and rock operas, just the way he sounded to me made me think that he sounded too much like a stereotypical DJ, that he in particular seemed to fit the expected norms of what I think a DJ sounds like too perfectly. According to Sartre, the DJ was denying transcendent qualities about himself. At the same time, though, in having this thought about the DJ being too much like a DJ, I was reducing him to mere facticity as well.
This dual attack on the waiter’s self made me feel a little unfair. On the one hand the observer sees the other and claims they are being too much like a mere object, that they are denying their transendency. On the other hand, by doing this the observer is embracing their own facticity by arguing that the other person, as an object in the world, is being too much like an object we expect, the ideal of the waiter. Together, I think that this limits the waiters and DJ’s by conceiving of them against a certain stereotype of being, and limit myself by having this conception of what the waiter is trying to be in the first place.
Thinking about this reminded me of Kierkegaard’s analysis of how we limit other beings by our own conceptions. In the case of the waiter, looking at him and saying that because he is “too real” he is being absorbed by facticity and denying the transcendent seems to limit his ability to be anything other than what I see. While the waiter is free to continuously fluxuate between different types of bad faith, I don’t see how an observer can actually say another is in bad faith without being in bad faith themselves. In order to say that the waiter is too much a being-in-itself I must reduce myself to a being-for-itself. The observer necessarily limits both themselves and the other to make this decision, even if they admit that they are both free in the ability to move from one state to the other.
I was wondering about Kierkegaard, though, whether he would look at the individual as limitless every time, refusing to acknowledge either their faciticy or transcendency but instead being completely open to the other as being free absolutely. I don’t know. I know Sartre is not denying possibilities for persons, but I’m having trouble thinking about it as at least to me, in order for me to know of myself, I contrast with others and in doing so limit them to a label, to a state, to something other than me. I guess I’m just tied up in how even when I may be capable of an infinite set of possibilities, it seems like I have to limit everyone else and fight the limitations perceived on of myself in order to be that way. I wasn’t sure if this was an accurate reading of Sartre, or just my confusion, but thinking about bad faith and others makes me feel that in order to be me I naturally limit others to being others, to being things in the world, while this limiting of others is at the same time a limitation on myself.
The example of the waiter stuck with more than with the other two, and also has given me an excuse to ramble about my own misunderstandings of Sartre. First, I agree with Professor Johnson that it is very easy to see Sartre’s description of what it means to be in “bad faith” played out in everyday interactions with others and in my own thinking. For example, driving back to campus yesterday I had an experience I thought was exactly like Sartre’s waiter example. As a friend skipped through radio stations, one DJ’s voice stood out very clearly. Talking about musicals and rock operas, just the way he sounded to me made me think that he sounded too much like a stereotypical DJ, that he in particular seemed to fit the expected norms of what I think a DJ sounds like too perfectly. According to Sartre, the DJ was denying transcendent qualities about himself. At the same time, though, in having this thought about the DJ being too much like a DJ, I was reducing him to mere facticity as well.
This dual attack on the waiter’s self made me feel a little unfair. On the one hand the observer sees the other and claims they are being too much like a mere object, that they are denying their transendency. On the other hand, by doing this the observer is embracing their own facticity by arguing that the other person, as an object in the world, is being too much like an object we expect, the ideal of the waiter. Together, I think that this limits the waiters and DJ’s by conceiving of them against a certain stereotype of being, and limit myself by having this conception of what the waiter is trying to be in the first place.
Thinking about this reminded me of Kierkegaard’s analysis of how we limit other beings by our own conceptions. In the case of the waiter, looking at him and saying that because he is “too real” he is being absorbed by facticity and denying the transcendent seems to limit his ability to be anything other than what I see. While the waiter is free to continuously fluxuate between different types of bad faith, I don’t see how an observer can actually say another is in bad faith without being in bad faith themselves. In order to say that the waiter is too much a being-in-itself I must reduce myself to a being-for-itself. The observer necessarily limits both themselves and the other to make this decision, even if they admit that they are both free in the ability to move from one state to the other.
I was wondering about Kierkegaard, though, whether he would look at the individual as limitless every time, refusing to acknowledge either their faciticy or transcendency but instead being completely open to the other as being free absolutely. I don’t know. I know Sartre is not denying possibilities for persons, but I’m having trouble thinking about it as at least to me, in order for me to know of myself, I contrast with others and in doing so limit them to a label, to a state, to something other than me. I guess I’m just tied up in how even when I may be capable of an infinite set of possibilities, it seems like I have to limit everyone else and fight the limitations perceived on of myself in order to be that way. I wasn’t sure if this was an accurate reading of Sartre, or just my confusion, but thinking about bad faith and others makes me feel that in order to be me I naturally limit others to being others, to being things in the world, while this limiting of others is at the same time a limitation on myself.
Sartre and Blade Runner
When we started discussing Sartre I immediately thought of the movie Blade Runner. The plot of the movie centers on the escape of several replicants, or artificial humans. As the movie progresses the humanity of the protagonist, Rick Deckard, becomes more and more questionable. BY the end of the film it becomes very hard to determine if Deckard is or is not a replicant. The objects of the Blade Runner universe are the replicants which though appearing just as human as actual humans they are denied their humanity and freedom, hunted, and killed because the natural humans do not deem them to actually be people. In fact, the way Blade Runner is presented it is impossible to truly determine who is a natural human and who is a replicant, with even Deckard’s own naturalness being called into question by critics. The characters of this film have embraced their facticity while denying their transcendence. They have become so rooted in and defined by objects that they seem to be nothing more than extensions of the objects. Where humans, those possessing both facticity and transcendence, should define objects, the objects of this world define the humans. Blade Runner goes so far as to make objects into humans so that the definition that the objects are giving is reflected upon themselves; humanity is subverted by inhumanity, objects develop more important roles than humans while humans are placed in a position of unclear meaning. With this in mind is it possible that a replicant could posses both facticity and transcendence since they act like humans, fear like humans, and behave like humans?B
Anguish
The Origin of Nothingness really got my mind going. When I read the part Sartre wrote about vertigo, it really hit me because that was a sensation that I have experienced countless times and never understood. Just like he said, when I’m on top of a tall building with a low railing, I’m reluctant to get too close to the edge, not because I’m afraid I will fall off, but I’m afraid my body might throw itself off somehow. It was as if I was scared my body would turn on me for some ridiculous reason. But as Sartre explains, it is anguish that we feel at these times because (aren’t we the self centered bunch) we see everything else as a subject to our life. If a bookcase somehow fell on me, I wouldn’t think “damn, if the bookcase had only fell the other way”, instead I would probably think “if only I had been standing a foot away this wouldn’t have hit me”. The possibilities of my life are my possibilities, as Sartre explains. They are singular as in my life. I believe what Sartre postulates, but I can’t help thinking that it makes us look egotistical and self-centered. The world revolves around each one of us in our own minds and we seem to think about everything in relation to us. In this new series I’ve been watching, Bored to Death, one of the characters explains to the other that they are each in their own movies and one sees the other merely as being featured in the life in which the one is the star. I find this analogy to be very true of human nature, we are consumed with ourselves and can’t help but one consider another person inasmuch as what we see of them. You don’t see a vast majority of the life of the people around you, but, for the most part, you only consider the parts that you see. They may go off and be completely different people away from you, and you would have no idea, and they would be one person in your life’s movie and a complete different person in someone else’s life movie. On top of that, that person sees you as just a character in their own movie. Anguish comes from inside and we mainly feel it in relation to ourselves. We feel anguish when we have to make an important decision, but we cannot feel anguish for someone else who is making an important decision, or at least that’s what I understand.
Dealing with Bad Faith
Let us return to the lovely couple out on their first date. The man makes his advance in the form of taking her hand. Sarte proposes that she acts in bad faith by feigning to notice. However, let us examine this from the prospective of the man. The man took her hand in order to create an immediate reaction and allow him to properly evaluate the situation. While Sarte explains her inaction as bad faith, the man does not have such luxury of understanding. Positive action on her part would tell him she was attracted; negative action would tell him she wasn’t. Either way, the action would at least confirm to him that his action—and intention—was received, and allow him continue according to her given response.
However, no response is uncertainty; it creates anguish. The woman’s apparent ignorance of his advancement baffles the man. Did she really not notice his hand? This is possible, perhaps, but the man thinks it unlikely. As he would have read her action, he now tries to read her inaction. He creates her possibilities: she likes him and she’s playing hard to get; or, she doesn’t like him but at the same time she doesn’t want to be rude, etc. Or, he realizes, these theories are solely the product of his own mind; she in fact did not notice his hand. But he is sure she had to have, so he presses for a more satisfactory explanation.
This is a form of nihilation. The man guesses at the situation by creating various attitudes for the woman, only to realize that these attitudes have no existence outside of his own mind; he has created nothing. It is possible, maybe even likely that he postulated accurately on what the woman was in fact thinking. However, given the gross ambiguity of the situation, it is extremely unlikely that he dwelled on that answer any longer then any of the others anyway. It may have in fact crossed his mind, for example, that she didn’t move her hand because she was pretending not to notice so she could postpone her decision. However, the man immediately realizes how preposterous such an idea is. Chances are, he reasons, she really didn’t notice his hand, and he is overanalyzing the whole situation.
Of course the woman felt his hand. Better yet, she knows exactly the anxiety she has created in the man. She knows her inaction utterly confuses the man because she knows it doesn’t make any sense to him. She knows because it is for this reason she left her hand there in the first place! So the man continues to think.
God and Freewill
I know that Sartre does not believe in God, I think his reasoning behind this comes from the fact that if God made us then we can only do what God programmed us to do. We would not have free will because we were programmed by some other being. From what I heard in class Sartre would not think robots and AI do not have free will because they were programmed by us. I do not think that created beings would not have free will though. I think that free will and the idea of someone creating us are not mutually exclusive. For example if God did not exist then that would mean that man would have been programmed by nature and the environment. It would mean that nature created man and gave us everything we have; it would have programmed us to follow survival of the fittest. It would mean that nature and the events around us encoded our genes and us to a certain destiny. This would mean that there is no free will. Nature and our environment would therefore be the only thing that governs us.
If this is the case and we were programmed by something else, then we do not have freewill. So either people can have freewill despite being initially programmed by God or nature or whatever, or freewill does not exist at all. Things like A.I. would therefore have freewill. So the super computer in the Terminator movies would be a rational being.
On a slightly different note why do people assume genetics take away peoples freewill? Like people with a genetic disposition to alcoholism do not have the freewill not to be an alcoholic. They make the choice every time they pick up a drink, and at anytime they can put it down if they really wanted too. They can choose not to drink. It seems to me that genetics are merely blueprints to the body, and that it merely guides people to survival. Instincts are merely tools to help people survive. If Sartre is right though and people are a blank slate when they are born, then people shouldn’t be influenced at all by genetics. But it seems true that genetics will greatly influence people’s decisions. Does Sartre take genetic disposition into account, does he think it matters in terms of freewill and how we choose, or are people truly blank slates that can only be influenced through our choices.
If this is the case and we were programmed by something else, then we do not have freewill. So either people can have freewill despite being initially programmed by God or nature or whatever, or freewill does not exist at all. Things like A.I. would therefore have freewill. So the super computer in the Terminator movies would be a rational being.
On a slightly different note why do people assume genetics take away peoples freewill? Like people with a genetic disposition to alcoholism do not have the freewill not to be an alcoholic. They make the choice every time they pick up a drink, and at anytime they can put it down if they really wanted too. They can choose not to drink. It seems to me that genetics are merely blueprints to the body, and that it merely guides people to survival. Instincts are merely tools to help people survive. If Sartre is right though and people are a blank slate when they are born, then people shouldn’t be influenced at all by genetics. But it seems true that genetics will greatly influence people’s decisions. Does Sartre take genetic disposition into account, does he think it matters in terms of freewill and how we choose, or are people truly blank slates that can only be influenced through our choices.
Existentialism in East of Eden
Sartre says that determinism would mean there is nothing special about human life and that it is a cop out, basically saying that you are not free, that you are governed by a certain thing. In class we discussed the idea of saying "oh, it's just in my genes" or my parents did so and so or had some disease or act a certain way, so I'm destined to do the same, which is also a cop out--it is saying that you have no control over your life and that you're just making excuses, and we know what Sartre would say about that--NO EXCUSES!
Anyway, this made me think of Cal in East of Eden. If you haven't read it, Cal is the son of Adam Trask and also has a twin brother Aron. In a nut shell, their birth mother Cathy Ames is the embodiment of evil in the book and extreamely manipulative and parastic became depressed after giving birth and wanted to kill the twins, as she did not want them in the first place and also didn't even want to marry in the first place. So instead, she shot Adam, her husband whom she didn't love (obviously), in the shoulder and and left him and the twins to be "free" and become a prostitute. In addition to killing her parents when she was a child, she also poisons and kills another woman. Overall, she is obsessed with committing sin and again, the embodiment of evil. So, when Adam finds out she is a prostitute he obviously wants to keep her identity concealed from his boys and does not want them to find out. But eventually, Cal, the darker of the twins who has evil tendencies does find out and hates her--however, he is also concerned about being just like his mother too:
'"I hate her because I know why she went away. I know--because I've got her in me." His head was down and his voice was heartbroken."
..Then Lee, their wise lifetime housekeeper and cook says:
"'Listen to me! You wouldn't even be wondering if you didn't have it. Don't you dare take the lazy way. It's too easy to excuse yourself because of your ancestry. Don't let me catch you doing it! Now--look close at me so you will remember. Whatever you do, it will be you who do it--not your mother."'
So first of all, Cal is fears he is just like his mother and destined to fail at life and that there's no hope f0r him. But lee then basically reiterates Sartre's ideas about breaking free from the idea of determinism and changes his mind. Go Lee!! Then, a little later, Cal actually goes to visit his mother he said to her: "I was afraid I had you in me," and she says "you have," and then finally he says "No, i haven't. I'm my own. I don't have to be you." This is the perfect example of realizing you are you and no one else and that you don't have to be tied down by determinism. You could either take the easy way out and give in or you can rise above determinism and become your own person.
Also, this brought up another point about Sartre's "Bad Faith." Adam Trask conceals the truth that he knows about the twin's mother to protect them. I know this is bad faith, but i guess it's almost like saying that it is lying, but lying to conceal an ugly truth--like "lying in a good way," if there is such a thing, which according to Sartre, I'm sure there's not, but personally I would not be about to tell my children my wife shot me in the shoulder, didn't really love me, and left them to become a prostitute. Just sayin' I think I would have to go ahead and be in bad faith on this one, Sartre.
Anyway, this made me think of Cal in East of Eden. If you haven't read it, Cal is the son of Adam Trask and also has a twin brother Aron. In a nut shell, their birth mother Cathy Ames is the embodiment of evil in the book and extreamely manipulative and parastic became depressed after giving birth and wanted to kill the twins, as she did not want them in the first place and also didn't even want to marry in the first place. So instead, she shot Adam, her husband whom she didn't love (obviously), in the shoulder and and left him and the twins to be "free" and become a prostitute. In addition to killing her parents when she was a child, she also poisons and kills another woman. Overall, she is obsessed with committing sin and again, the embodiment of evil. So, when Adam finds out she is a prostitute he obviously wants to keep her identity concealed from his boys and does not want them to find out. But eventually, Cal, the darker of the twins who has evil tendencies does find out and hates her--however, he is also concerned about being just like his mother too:
'"I hate her because I know why she went away. I know--because I've got her in me." His head was down and his voice was heartbroken."
..Then Lee, their wise lifetime housekeeper and cook says:
"'Listen to me! You wouldn't even be wondering if you didn't have it. Don't you dare take the lazy way. It's too easy to excuse yourself because of your ancestry. Don't let me catch you doing it! Now--look close at me so you will remember. Whatever you do, it will be you who do it--not your mother."'
So first of all, Cal is fears he is just like his mother and destined to fail at life and that there's no hope f0r him. But lee then basically reiterates Sartre's ideas about breaking free from the idea of determinism and changes his mind. Go Lee!! Then, a little later, Cal actually goes to visit his mother he said to her: "I was afraid I had you in me," and she says "you have," and then finally he says "No, i haven't. I'm my own. I don't have to be you." This is the perfect example of realizing you are you and no one else and that you don't have to be tied down by determinism. You could either take the easy way out and give in or you can rise above determinism and become your own person.
Also, this brought up another point about Sartre's "Bad Faith." Adam Trask conceals the truth that he knows about the twin's mother to protect them. I know this is bad faith, but i guess it's almost like saying that it is lying, but lying to conceal an ugly truth--like "lying in a good way," if there is such a thing, which according to Sartre, I'm sure there's not, but personally I would not be about to tell my children my wife shot me in the shoulder, didn't really love me, and left them to become a prostitute. Just sayin' I think I would have to go ahead and be in bad faith on this one, Sartre.
Love Is Dead
Love Is Dead
In contemplation of Sartre's Patterns of Bad Faith in conjunction with the horrific nature of my past relationships, I began to consider the principles applied in Sartre's work in relation to my relations. One qualm that's been plaguing me in my pre-sleep state amidst a plethora of beta waves, when I should be thinking about unicorns, rainbows, and guppies like every other little girl, is the question of love. Love to me has become only a question, and in it, I cannot find any substance, transfer of certain chemicals, intransigence, or truth. I believe that there is a certain feeling that accompanies specific actions, but I can no longer allow myself to subscribe to the heavily processed system of 'love." I think that what people associate with the word love has never existed. The feeling is instead something much less powerful and miraculous. My drive to believe in love and seek it is sadly little more than an instinct to seed a harvest of young baby monster Sams. I believe a lot about relationships and interactions and feeling, but having read Patterns of Bad Faith, I cannot accept 'love." I for those looking for comment boosts...I am not at all saying there are no meaningful relationships....blah blah blah....nor am I saying that drugs are good, and religion is bad.
The love I am referring to in this post is the relationship brand of love, as opposed to the love in which I can really love America, or the Jonas Brothers, or circular silver refrigerator magnets. Just as no one can ever truly achieve good faith, it is just as impossible to achieve love. Personal love (I don't have the time or desire to discuss love in terms of agape, so I'm omitting that until another time) is a strong attachment between two people in which each subject has a locked attachment to the other in a purely volitional sense, such that they are not driven to love as a means for certain wants. I believe that this love can never be achieved just as good faith because it would require intense work in order to achieve such a thing, and in the same vein, it would require an awareness in treating love like an object, attaching to it "a permanence like that of things," so that it may be maintained. Love is like an attempt to find some sort of suspension between choosing between the facticity and the transcendence found in humans, as if we are above making decisions when we are not. Belief in love allows for us to will strongly that the strong attachment felt at a moment, which is almost infinitely enjoyable, will never cease to be, and in doing so, we are in denial.
student
I was drawn in on thursday by our brief discussion on the student. Within this discussion we defined student both as a noun and a verb. All students (n.) are capable of learning and, ideally if they are good they do just that. But often times what happens (and what I did pretty much all through high school) is the student adapts to the system and, instead of focusing on learning, they focus on studenting (v.). Studenting, as Dr. J put it so well, is basically gaming the system. This can include writing papers right before the deadline (no pun intended seeing as this blog post is a bit down to the wire), creating an easy schedule of classes, or doing just enough for the desired grade and not for the knowledge. Studenting can involve learning if the student is good, but does not inherently include it. I am confident that we are all guilty of both learning and studenting at some point in our academic careers, some of us with more favorable ratios than others. I remember all of the endless and seemingly pointless math worksheets and spanish exercises in high school which I did between classes, during lunch in the cafeteria, or even with one eye on my peer's completed work. I'm not exactly proud of it, but our discussion on thursday suggested that maybe I was merely honing my skills as a student. I was just playing the system that was put before me.
My lingering question, however, is what happened when I got to college? Isn't the idea of college that there is less busy work like the math worksheets, and more genuinely productive work? Does college lend itself more to learning and less to studenting? I certainly agree with this sentiment in that I have much less (if any) work that I view as "pointless." I can see the objective in every assignment that is put before me and as a result, I feel that I am learning much more. But perhaps, as a friend suggested to me, we are just learning to student differently, to con another system.
Saturday, October 10, 2009
The “Objectification” of Nothingness
In “Existentialism is a Humanism,” Sartre begins with explaining that the existence of a being precedes that being’s essence. He sees existence as the possibility of freedom in the world. The fact that humans have freedom makes it possible for beings "to nihilate" certain possibilities. This act of nihilation is used by Sartre to further explain the concept of nothingness in “ The Origin of Nothingness.” He explains that nothingness happens as an act of nihilation. Nothingness is a means of experiencing an absence of something in the world. A being is not his past or future being but simply its present being. A being is not its past being in a sense that it is marked in part by an absence in the past; that being is in the mode of not being himself (in the past) which is in turn nothingness. Along the same lines, a being cannot be its future being as it is not possible to determine what the future being would be if the being is not actually able to be there which is caused by the basis of the nothingness. In order for nothingness to be possible, the absence of a being has to be experienced by another person besides the being himself. Hence, nothingness has to be recognized by others in order for it to be considered the basis of the being's existence.
However, what if there was a person that was very isolated from society all of his life. He may have been seen by people he passed in the street but he was not actually recognized by anyone around in a significant way. He was alone from the beginning of his life without any identifiable parents and had never genuinely been recognized by anyone but himself. Because he is not recognized by anyone, then his being would not have nothingness if no one else realizes his nothingness. If his being’s nothingness is not recognized it would be difficult for him to implement his absence as an act of nihilation; therefore, if he is unable to implement nihilation in turn he is not choosing one possibility over another. Without the ability for possibility to be nihilated, a being cannot have complete freedom which is the basis of our existence. So without having our nothingness recognized by others, we are deprived of our ability to nihilate possibilities which is also eliminating our freedom. Freedom is what distinguishes us from objects which have no possibilities. Without others realizing our absence we loose our distinguishing features of being a being- for- itself that has freedom and possibilities.
If a person is not recognized by others his nothingness is not realized either so if nothingness is the basis of a being’s existence then does the hypothetical being described become a being- in- itself (an object) as opposed to a being- for - itself (being with freedom)?
However, what if there was a person that was very isolated from society all of his life. He may have been seen by people he passed in the street but he was not actually recognized by anyone around in a significant way. He was alone from the beginning of his life without any identifiable parents and had never genuinely been recognized by anyone but himself. Because he is not recognized by anyone, then his being would not have nothingness if no one else realizes his nothingness. If his being’s nothingness is not recognized it would be difficult for him to implement his absence as an act of nihilation; therefore, if he is unable to implement nihilation in turn he is not choosing one possibility over another. Without the ability for possibility to be nihilated, a being cannot have complete freedom which is the basis of our existence. So without having our nothingness recognized by others, we are deprived of our ability to nihilate possibilities which is also eliminating our freedom. Freedom is what distinguishes us from objects which have no possibilities. Without others realizing our absence we loose our distinguishing features of being a being- for- itself that has freedom and possibilities.
If a person is not recognized by others his nothingness is not realized either so if nothingness is the basis of a being’s existence then does the hypothetical being described become a being- in- itself (an object) as opposed to a being- for - itself (being with freedom)?
Sartre’s entire philosophy is based on the freedom humans have because a human’s existence precedes his or her essence. It seems intuitively true that we are free. When I get up in the morning, I have a choice whether to go to class or skip work or to wear whatever I want, etc.
But there are certain philosophies, i.e. Determinism, that tell us the exact opposite. We are human animals conditioned in such a way as to make decisions based on our genetic make-up and how we were socialized. To jump-off from where Jen left off on her previous post, examine the man with the “alcoholic” gene. The man may have the gene to be an alcoholic but chooses not to drink a sip of alcohol in his life. But why would he do his? One could point to his upbringing. The man was raised by an alcoholic father and saw the awful effects of alcoholism and his mother encouraged him never to have a sip of alcohol.
Sartre might respond to this by saying that this example is completely consistent with freedom because one could imagine another man (Man B) having the same situation as Man A, and making a completely different decision. Man B could have an alcoholic father, the alcoholism gene, and a mother who encouraged him not to drink. And yet, Man B could certainly choose to become an alcoholic. Indeed there are empirical examples of both of these decisions being made.
The determinist could respond by questioning whether Man A and Man B’s situations were absolutely identical. There are subtle differences in the genes and situations of Man A and Man B. Maybe Man A’s mother was more caring and attentive than Man B’s mother. Or perhaps Man A had a passion to become a philosophy professor (due to genetic and social factors, of course), while Man B was awful at school (genetic intelligence factors) and thereby had a low self esteem which contributed to his alcoholism. No matter how specific the situation is, the determinist could argue that there is a factor that we have not accounted for. However, no matter how specific the situation is, the existentialist will argue that a human could have decided differently.
Despite all of the different arguments, determinism merely assumes that causes are there whether we can identify them or not, while Existentialism assumes that causes are not there, which is why we can not identify them.
If determinism is true, however, why do we experience guilt or pride? When a human being accomplishes something great, he or she has an emotional reaction. This is not merely restricted to moral decisions, but also extends to creating great philosophies, making great works of art, and making important scientific discoveries. There was no moral imperative to motivate him/her. Although he/she may say things like “I could have never done this without the support of my family” or “My colleagues were integral in my success,” he/she still has the feeling that “I accomplished this.” In a similar way, the alcoholic, Man B, can feel guilt. It does not matter if he has an alcoholism gene or had an awful childhood. And even if Man B hurts no one else, he still feels disappointed in himself and guilty about his actions. This is because he feels that he could have made the opposite choice, but, instead, he chose to be an alcoholic.
Determinism could say that these feelings of guilt and pride are programmed into us, but I think that they are indications of our self-knowledge of our own free-will. There is no moral imperative to “be great at something” (though you will receive praise if you are) and the alcoholic should be guilt-free if he hurts no one but himself. However, we have these feelings of pride and guilt because they are natural emotions that arise from a free-will.
But there are certain philosophies, i.e. Determinism, that tell us the exact opposite. We are human animals conditioned in such a way as to make decisions based on our genetic make-up and how we were socialized. To jump-off from where Jen left off on her previous post, examine the man with the “alcoholic” gene. The man may have the gene to be an alcoholic but chooses not to drink a sip of alcohol in his life. But why would he do his? One could point to his upbringing. The man was raised by an alcoholic father and saw the awful effects of alcoholism and his mother encouraged him never to have a sip of alcohol.
Sartre might respond to this by saying that this example is completely consistent with freedom because one could imagine another man (Man B) having the same situation as Man A, and making a completely different decision. Man B could have an alcoholic father, the alcoholism gene, and a mother who encouraged him not to drink. And yet, Man B could certainly choose to become an alcoholic. Indeed there are empirical examples of both of these decisions being made.
The determinist could respond by questioning whether Man A and Man B’s situations were absolutely identical. There are subtle differences in the genes and situations of Man A and Man B. Maybe Man A’s mother was more caring and attentive than Man B’s mother. Or perhaps Man A had a passion to become a philosophy professor (due to genetic and social factors, of course), while Man B was awful at school (genetic intelligence factors) and thereby had a low self esteem which contributed to his alcoholism. No matter how specific the situation is, the determinist could argue that there is a factor that we have not accounted for. However, no matter how specific the situation is, the existentialist will argue that a human could have decided differently.
Despite all of the different arguments, determinism merely assumes that causes are there whether we can identify them or not, while Existentialism assumes that causes are not there, which is why we can not identify them.
If determinism is true, however, why do we experience guilt or pride? When a human being accomplishes something great, he or she has an emotional reaction. This is not merely restricted to moral decisions, but also extends to creating great philosophies, making great works of art, and making important scientific discoveries. There was no moral imperative to motivate him/her. Although he/she may say things like “I could have never done this without the support of my family” or “My colleagues were integral in my success,” he/she still has the feeling that “I accomplished this.” In a similar way, the alcoholic, Man B, can feel guilt. It does not matter if he has an alcoholism gene or had an awful childhood. And even if Man B hurts no one else, he still feels disappointed in himself and guilty about his actions. This is because he feels that he could have made the opposite choice, but, instead, he chose to be an alcoholic.
Determinism could say that these feelings of guilt and pride are programmed into us, but I think that they are indications of our self-knowledge of our own free-will. There is no moral imperative to “be great at something” (though you will receive praise if you are) and the alcoholic should be guilt-free if he hurts no one but himself. However, we have these feelings of pride and guilt because they are natural emotions that arise from a free-will.
Wednesday, October 7, 2009
The Effects of Biological Predispositions on our Self-Created Essence
Sartre’s philosophy is concerned with personal responsibility. He believes that our ability to think shows that we are entirely free. We are born into the world without any traits, but we develop our persona as a result of the choices we make. For instance, an honest person is not such because he was born that way; rather, he becomes honest after he acts truthfully in a situation where he could lie. Basically we are not born into any particular situation, because we have infinite possibilities on how to mold our lives. However, this seems to bring about too big of a responsibility for humans, according to Sartre. Thus, the huge responsibility causes people to have tremendous anxiety. Sartre believes that we experience anxiety because we suddenly become aware of the possibilities in store for us. We discussed in class that we don’t have to graduate from Rhodes, and go on to some graduate school or the workforce. We feel the need to do so, however, because it gives more purpose to our lives. Thus, the actions make up our essence that we create for ourselves. Because humans are faced with such deterministic responsibilities, we purposefully seek ideas or concepts that will make choices for us.
I find this perspective somewhat problematic. Sartre’s philosophy is not supported by scientific research that proves the existence of biological predispositions for certain habits or personality traits. Sartre believes that humans tend to blame our genes for the way we act. While human’s have (what seems to be) an endless variety of choices to make in order to create our “essence”, there are cases where the possibilities are limited due to our genetic makeup.
Take, for instance, depression. While there are cases where the person may be in mourning or traumatized in some way, depression is a genetically linked ailment. The brain of a depressed person simply cannot produce the proper amount of neurotransmitter. The family members of a depressed individual may be vulnerable to this chemical deficiency as well. These predispositions are then present before birth. Although one may be proactive about their condition and assume responsibility, the depression itself was determined for that person before birth (based on its genetic link), and will affect this person’s behavior throughout its life.
Secondly, alcoholism is another genetically linked dependence that again, is determined before the person is born. For these reasons, I find it difficult to completely agree with Sartre. It is important to understand that inherited disorders can deeply impair a person from having full control over his or her life.
Based on Sartre’s idea that we are born without traits, I wonder how Sartre feels about homosexuality, in terms of it being natural or not. He clearly condemns homosexuality, in the sense that he refers to the "guilt" that homosexuals must feel. But it seems that he assumes homosexuality as something that someone determines for themselves. In contrast, there are a number of scientific studies demonstrating that humans or animals do not consciously “choose” which sex they are attracted to. A study in 2006 on News-medical.net demonstrated that over 1,500 species have demonstrated homosexual or bisexual characteristics, including apes, lions, and dolphins. Thus, it is suggested that homosexuality is determined before birth and occurs naturally. However, it seems that Sartre would see it as a choice made by that person; it is something that that person feels is necessary for his or her “essence.”
While humans take responsibility for themselves for the most part (choosing a job, or education, acting honestly, or kindly, etc.), it is possible that a person has predetermined traits that will affect the creation of his or her essence.
I find this perspective somewhat problematic. Sartre’s philosophy is not supported by scientific research that proves the existence of biological predispositions for certain habits or personality traits. Sartre believes that humans tend to blame our genes for the way we act. While human’s have (what seems to be) an endless variety of choices to make in order to create our “essence”, there are cases where the possibilities are limited due to our genetic makeup.
Take, for instance, depression. While there are cases where the person may be in mourning or traumatized in some way, depression is a genetically linked ailment. The brain of a depressed person simply cannot produce the proper amount of neurotransmitter. The family members of a depressed individual may be vulnerable to this chemical deficiency as well. These predispositions are then present before birth. Although one may be proactive about their condition and assume responsibility, the depression itself was determined for that person before birth (based on its genetic link), and will affect this person’s behavior throughout its life.
Secondly, alcoholism is another genetically linked dependence that again, is determined before the person is born. For these reasons, I find it difficult to completely agree with Sartre. It is important to understand that inherited disorders can deeply impair a person from having full control over his or her life.
Based on Sartre’s idea that we are born without traits, I wonder how Sartre feels about homosexuality, in terms of it being natural or not. He clearly condemns homosexuality, in the sense that he refers to the "guilt" that homosexuals must feel. But it seems that he assumes homosexuality as something that someone determines for themselves. In contrast, there are a number of scientific studies demonstrating that humans or animals do not consciously “choose” which sex they are attracted to. A study in 2006 on News-medical.net demonstrated that over 1,500 species have demonstrated homosexual or bisexual characteristics, including apes, lions, and dolphins. Thus, it is suggested that homosexuality is determined before birth and occurs naturally. However, it seems that Sartre would see it as a choice made by that person; it is something that that person feels is necessary for his or her “essence.”
While humans take responsibility for themselves for the most part (choosing a job, or education, acting honestly, or kindly, etc.), it is possible that a person has predetermined traits that will affect the creation of his or her essence.
Saturday, October 3, 2009
A few open thoughts
Hey,
As everyone knows I don't do much talking in class but a lot of times I am thinking about a lot of things. Our last class caused me to question a particular more than usual. I remember one point we touched on was concerning our concept of objects. We said that, and please correct me if I'm wrong, objects don't have freedoms or responsibilities however, it made me think of three movies: A.I. Artificial Intelligence, I, Robot, and Biccentinial Man with Robin Williams. I was questioning to myself in class about whether or not people would agree that Robots did indeed have a free will or not, especially those in the movie I Robot? I say this in favor of the idea that to a degree, I believe robots have a free will and are able to do what they want, as long as it does extend outside of their programming. But some people may say well Robots are only programmed to do certain things and, although that may be true for our time now but if we take into reference the movies listed above it can reasonably be assumed that we are not too far off from these types of Robots existing. My main point about this is that Robots are objects yet, what would be said towards their 'future' ability to govern themselves and make decisions, even those decisions that may have the potential for harming their own creators. But, then there are those that still say well the robots in the future are still robots and they still cannot do things outside of their programming - they are limited. However, if we were only to look at robots as things that cannot exceed their programming are we not ourselves robots? We ourselves have limits. Like Dr. J likes to point out we cannot defy gravity, we cannot choose to be a certain height and other things; thus, we cannot go outside of our limits either. Also, some poeple say that well, you may be right about that Jordan but our freedom is God given whereas a robots is not. But, to that I will say this. Let's just pretend that you have a robot, he begins to act crazy, and what do you do? You say to him "If you don't act better I'm going to shut you down or reprogram you?" You ultimately threaten your robot. Does not God threaten those that do not follow his commandment with condemnation to hell? Religously, God created humans and humans have created Robots yet, humans CAN BE NOTHING MORE THAN the same as robots because both creators have given each of their creations limitations (sometimes the human creator even gives his robot creations less limitations that himself). Has he not given humans free will and humans "will," in a sense, one day give robots free will. It will still be the arguement that robots have programming but that indeed is still what humans live by themselves such as, the "Ten Commandments" and the bible. Also, just personally, I think that God does not give freedom because those that follow him are always living in the thought of "is what I'm doing okay with God?" There cannot be total freedom with strict regulations attached. When I think of this I think of the old Ford Motor Company propoganda "You can buy any color truck, as long as it's black." It's like God says you can do all these things for which I give you the opportunity, as long as you do them exactly as I say.
As everyone knows I don't do much talking in class but a lot of times I am thinking about a lot of things. Our last class caused me to question a particular more than usual. I remember one point we touched on was concerning our concept of objects. We said that, and please correct me if I'm wrong, objects don't have freedoms or responsibilities however, it made me think of three movies: A.I. Artificial Intelligence, I, Robot, and Biccentinial Man with Robin Williams. I was questioning to myself in class about whether or not people would agree that Robots did indeed have a free will or not, especially those in the movie I Robot? I say this in favor of the idea that to a degree, I believe robots have a free will and are able to do what they want, as long as it does extend outside of their programming. But some people may say well Robots are only programmed to do certain things and, although that may be true for our time now but if we take into reference the movies listed above it can reasonably be assumed that we are not too far off from these types of Robots existing. My main point about this is that Robots are objects yet, what would be said towards their 'future' ability to govern themselves and make decisions, even those decisions that may have the potential for harming their own creators. But, then there are those that still say well the robots in the future are still robots and they still cannot do things outside of their programming - they are limited. However, if we were only to look at robots as things that cannot exceed their programming are we not ourselves robots? We ourselves have limits. Like Dr. J likes to point out we cannot defy gravity, we cannot choose to be a certain height and other things; thus, we cannot go outside of our limits either. Also, some poeple say that well, you may be right about that Jordan but our freedom is God given whereas a robots is not. But, to that I will say this. Let's just pretend that you have a robot, he begins to act crazy, and what do you do? You say to him "If you don't act better I'm going to shut you down or reprogram you?" You ultimately threaten your robot. Does not God threaten those that do not follow his commandment with condemnation to hell? Religously, God created humans and humans have created Robots yet, humans CAN BE NOTHING MORE THAN the same as robots because both creators have given each of their creations limitations (sometimes the human creator even gives his robot creations less limitations that himself). Has he not given humans free will and humans "will," in a sense, one day give robots free will. It will still be the arguement that robots have programming but that indeed is still what humans live by themselves such as, the "Ten Commandments" and the bible. Also, just personally, I think that God does not give freedom because those that follow him are always living in the thought of "is what I'm doing okay with God?" There cannot be total freedom with strict regulations attached. When I think of this I think of the old Ford Motor Company propoganda "You can buy any color truck, as long as it's black." It's like God says you can do all these things for which I give you the opportunity, as long as you do them exactly as I say.
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