possibilites+anxiety+freedom=individuality?

In Dostoevsky’s Notes From Underground, the underground man believes he is able to exercise his freedom (that is, his choice rather than reason) by going against the ethical, by not receiving help for his illness. Though he is reasonably not acting in his best interest, he believes it is in his own best interest, or "the most advantageous advantage" to exercise is ability to be and to keep himself an individual--not a robot, not a machine, not a "piano key." He urges to assure himself that humans' lives are not entirely determined, that an individual can defy the laws of science and rationality. Thus, he does not receive help.

But back to the concept of an individual's best-interest: in regard to Kierkegaard's idea of anxiety, which he says is caused by endless possibilities and freedom, why would someone actually want to have anxiety? Why put yourself through the suffering? Obviously, we know Kierkegaard would argue that anxiety makes one "more of a man" and that again, we know we are free in regard to possibilities and choices, but it is not necessarily in our best interest, not reasonable, to be anxious, to lie awake at night thinking about possibilities, rather than sleeping (which would reasonably be the best choice). But like the underground man, are we constantly going against our best interest in order to be anxious? I suppose that Dostoevsky would also see anxiety in this sense as going against reason and rationality to exercise our freedom and explore the endless possibilities in life—it is irrational, but that is because rationality cannot be subjective—so therefore, is it our irrationality that makes us individuals?

Also, according to Kierkegaard, it is understanding that restricts possibilities, for understanding is “anticipating possibility” as a result, not as what it is--as a possibility. Thus, if we are constantly trying to understand, we are simply trying to make our lives easier. So, if we have anxiety about the future, about graduation, about identity, about this blog, we are making our lives more complex and therefore more open to possibilities—more possibilities mean more anxiety, which means more freedom, which means more individuality, I suppose; but what about universal anticipation, such as an event like 9-11? After this disaster that struck, the nation was devastated, as well as extremely anxious about possible future terrorist attacks. Though everyone was affected by the trauma, even if not directly so, it was apparent that our nation came closer, more united, because of the event. However, Kierkegaard would say that there is not universal anticipation or worrying, because though the majority of our nation may have suffered because of the attack, everyone’s suffering or anxiety is subjective. We cannot all worry the same, and if we did, we would not be individuals. So, I suppose that even if an event like 9-11 can change the whole nation, the nation as a whole can never suffer the same, individually—we have the freedom to suffer or anticipate as individuals, in endless ways: even if the exact same traumatic event happens to two people, those people will each suffer or anticipate in completely different ways. However, what does it mean to be able relate with someone in this way?—do we try to understand their pain? Or simply realize one will never feel the exact same pain as another individual, so their pain is insignificant?

Changed Phrases?

During our in-class discussions for the past week or so, I have thought a lot about common phrases (for example, "when one door closes, two more open.") In some ways, I agree with these statements. However, in the context of the excerpts from Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky, as well as our discussion of Descartes in class, the meaning of these phrases has somewhat changed for me.

"When one door closes, two more open."

In class, we discussed how the realization of the infinite number or possibilities causes a lot of anxiety, and as humans, we naturally try to limit those possibilities, eliminating the more improbable ones from our minds. This reduces anxiety and makes our collection of possibilities more finite. However, because the possibilities are endless, can anything ever be eliminated as a possibility? This is the question that I was asking myself regarding the phrase "when one door closes, two more open." If no possibilities can ever really be eliminated, no doors would ever close. If the number of possibilities are endless, it wouldn't matter if one door closed for two more to open. For that matter, several could spontaneously open. On the other hand, we could argue for the possibility that no doors are ever closed.

The second example that I would like to bring up comes from the movie I Heart Huckabee's (sorry to whoever mentioned that they hate this movie on the first day of class) in the scene where Brad Stand is broken down by the existential detectives. He ends up dwelling on the phrase "how am I not myself?" until he breaks down in a business meeting when asked to tell the story that he tells repeatedly to cover up something else that is truly bothering him. I wonder if it is possible to not be yourself. To reference Descartes, all he could not doubt was that he thinks, and is. If we are thinking like Descartes, and only know for sure that we are, then how can you not be yourself?

Reorienting the Ethical

Ethical systems are conceived in order to protect the majority of people. In doing this, the prescribed conventions of the ethical sphere often marginalize and ignore the needs of some people. And while the ethics are often changed according to social attitudes, I wonder how actively we engage in the ethical. When I hold a person responsible for an action or act according to social convention, I am not actively thinking about what I am doing. The ethical simply provides the framework that orients the way in which I function in society. It is almost an unconscious engagement in which I am a participant but rarely evaluate or question my participation.

I wonder how changes in the ethical sphere take place. The first thing that comes to mind is the civil rights movement, where a group of marginalized people recognized an ethical problem and actively worked to remedy that problem. But how do we go about changing social attitudes? How do we change the broad and thoughtless ways in which we interact with one another? Are we compromising our singularity and the singularity of others by participating in the ethical at all?

While certain aspects of our ethical lives are conferred upon silently without evaluation, it does not seem to be essential or necessary. Perhaps if we embrace our singularity (by this, I do not mean to say that we all should try and be the Underground Man and reject the ethical for the sake of expressing our freedom) we can have more truthful and holistic conception of humanity. Engaging in this practice is hard, really hard. How am I supposed to interact with another person without first fitting that person into a series of prescribed categories that seem appropriate?

Maybe we can't completely reject the ethical (and I do not think we should), but I think that we may be able to change our attitudes and consequently reorient the ethical to those attitudes by embracing our singularity.

The Underground Man's Reasoning

Here is something to prepare you for what will be said in the next paragraph. I may be mistaken in what I am saying because I am connecting what is rational and ethical as pretty much the same thing. Dostoyevsky claims that the conclusion of that the underground man came to makes him irrational. Not so much the process by which he gets to the conclusion. Dostoevsky seems to associate what is ethical with what is rational. For example the doctor says it is rational to get treatment because it is in your best interest, and it is ethical for you as an individual to act in your best interest. That is where I get my connection between the rational and the ethical.

I believe that The problem with Dostoevsky's argument for freewill is that he claims that there is only one universal definition of what counts as rational. He claims that working against rationality proves that we have free will. He claims that turning down a liver operation proves that he is not a logic calculator. However he never asks by what standard is he acting irrational. There are many different philosophies that discuss which action are ethical, and which actions are rational. Kant for example says that reason should dictate ethics. He says that we should "act as if the maxim from which you act were to become through your will a universal law". He says that it is rational and ethical to act in a way that is applicable to everybody, and to not act in this way is a violation of the rational, and the ethical. He says that if you do not act in a universal way you violated what reason should tell you. A Hedonist claims that a rational man will maximize pleasure and minimize pain. Among the many philosophies there are many different criteria people have for rational people.

I am asking by what standard is the underground man acting irrationally? Is what is rational defined by what benefits a person as an individual? Is what is rational defined by what can be applied to everyone universally like Kant said? To Kant you are not using reason if you decide to live like a hedonist. To a hedonist the same thing can be said about kant. I make say these things to demonstrate that many different philosophies have their own idea of what is rational.

The underground man Dostoevsky discusses is not acting irrationally and thus proving his free will, he merely makes his own version of rationality. He decided that he was going to take the doctor’s version of rationality and do the exact opposite.He made a rational idea that says it is ethical he should do the opposite of whatever the doctor says will help him, so as to prove he has free will because he did not have to follow the other guys rational idea. He still used logic to come to his conclusion. The underground man still acts rationally; It is just by his own definition. Using this new definition of reason he concludes that his action is ethical because it will make him think he has freewill. I think if you agree with me that the underground man had his own definition of reason, then the argument for whether or not someone has freewill completely changes.

Hopefully you comments will help me iron out my argument.

Dostoevsky, happy version

Alright, so people have been ragging on Dostoevsky, which I can understand considering his extremely pessimistic and often sarcastic writing style. I think, however, that we can uncover a suprisingly happy result if we strip Dostoevsky of his sarcastic flare and apply his ideas to something that makes us all feel warm and fuzzy inside (hopefully)-love.

First off, let me say that the following thoughts are my intended post revamped a little after reading Hugh's last post ("Dostoevsky and Problems of Free Will"), and I encourage reading it before finishing this one off (it was a good post!). Now, let's continue our exploration of Dostoevsky.

Something that really caught my eye while reading Dostoevsky was his use of metaphors. One might say that this is the heart of his sarcasm and flare, but I think if we carefully examine his metaphors and language choice from a nuetral perspective concerning thier relation to his key ideas, we can pull much meaning out of Doestoevsky's work. Particularly, I think his comparison of man to a piano key helped add meaning to his seemingly bitter and angry rant. First, note that Dostoevsky introduces his "man as a piano key" metaphor after discussing the fact that even if you endow man with complete prosperity and comfort, which is at the most basic level what is most advantageous- complete comfort and security to pursue whatever might entice him- he will still rebel against that existence and throw away all that comfort simply because he can (46-47). Specifically, he will do this to prove that he is more than a "piano key." One might say that man will in fact not respond to a situation such as the above in this way, but look at history. Such historical figures such as Francis of Asisi, Bob Marley, and Socrates have made completely irrational sacrifices at the expense of their own "advantage." So, let us at least admit that these characters exist, who have broken the mold of maximizing their own personal advantage for the sake of some other aim. Now, consider a piano; at the press of a key, a certain sound is expected. If that sound is not produced, we say that the piano is out of tune, broken, as it were, and needs repair. Turning back now to Dostoevsky's idea of the importance of being a "man" rather than just a piano key, notice that the underlying theme of the metaphor is that of limitation. By responding to certain comfortable circumstances with satisfaction at the maximization of his own advantages, man limits himself to simply responding to certain circumstances in the appropriate and expected manner, just as a piano key produces the expected result, a sound classified as "middle C," for example. According to Dostoevsky, our existence is more meaningful because we have the ability to make our own result, to break out of the expected response with an action that we have complete ownership of, rather than with an action whose worth has been assigned by society, or by the "rationalists." This, according to Dostoevsky, is what makes man special-- his ability to completely break out of expected response in a way that represents his, and only his, existence. This action cannot and need not be explained or justified because man's existence does not depend on another's perception of his defiant actions, rather the motivation for this action comes from within the individual and is at a level unqualifiable and unexplainable to others.

Now, let us take these ideas into a discussion of something happy, love! One might say that of the historical figures listed above, love motivated their apparent disregard for personal advantage (we're using "advantage" in the sense Dostoevsky uses it), whether it be love for God, for Truth, or for a certain way of life. Also, here is where I'll in part reply to the concerns that Hugh raises. First, let us assume that man has no free will, but rather is part of a series of reactions that, for instance, fits into the most holy plan of God. Now, say that you are a devout Christian, and you chose to sell your possessions, donate your money to the Church, and devote your life to helping others, out of a love for God and respect for his Children. Remember, however, that these actions are not a product of your free will, but rather are the product of the divine Plan. Will your devotion out of love for those around you, or for God, or what have you, have any meaning whatsoever? Did you chose to love? In fact, you were chosen to love by some other power, albeit a divine one. In my opinion, and I think both Kierkegaard and Dostoevsky would agree, the lack of free will with which to make that irrational choice to love unconditionally completely nullifies any worth in any "loving" action that you might perform. Even in another example, if you chose to love your spouse unconditionally, as prescribed by your vows, yet that choice is not truly yours, do you have a truly special bond with that person, or is that bond bankrupted of its power by the lack of choice invovled?

Personally, I would like to believe that as an individual I have free will. Thus, every action I perform, whether it fits the mold or breaks the mold, can be performed as a direct reflection of my will, and thus my true self, rather than as a reflection of some other will. Therefore, not only am I truly accountable for the consequences of my actions, but my life has meaning which I myself created, and have complete responsibility for. Only then is my existence truly real, and only then can I lead a life aware of the fact that I am a meaningful individual, rather than just a cog in the machine. Without free will, I am simply an automaton reacting to given stimuli in the prescribed manner, and my life as a human being, something supposedly special, is meaningless and simply animal and instinctual.

Is strong Free Will really required for someone morally accountable?

What I'm going to term strong free will basically says holds on to this principle: if an agent is morally responsible for A-ing (performing or willing some action), then s/he must have been able to refrain from A-ing (i.e., possibly not A-ed given the exact same conditions, including the agent's set of beliefs, attitudes, and desires.) To me, our reading from Notes from the Underground seems in line with this construction of strong free will, as the underground man numerous times says something along the lines of making decisions is not the same as getting the square root of a number.

IMO, there is a fairly strong thought experiment counterexample to the claim that in order for someone to be responsible for an action that necessarily have to have strong free will at the time. I will say in advance that in no way does this completely obliterate our the idea that someone needs to have been able to have done otherwise (in the robust sense mentioned above) in order to be morally responsible for what they've done, only that it illustrates that our free will does not always reliably ground being responsible. In other words, free will is not a necessary condition for being morally responsible.

The example I have in mind originally comes from the philosopher Harry Frankfurt, but I'm going to use philosopher John Martin Fischer’s version, because it's the clearest and includes a prior sign to establish how Black can know what Jones intends to do.

"Suppose Jones is in a voting booth, deliberating about whether to vote for Gore or Bush. After reflection, he chooses to vote for Gore…unbeknownst to him, Black, a liberal neurosurgeon…has implanted a device in Jones’ brain which monitors Jones’ brain activity. If Jones is about to choose to vote for Gore, Black’s device simply keeps monitoring and does not intervene in Jones’ process in any way. If, however, Jones to about to vote [for anyone other than Gore, say Bush, which Jones displays through an involuntary sign at T1]…the device intervenes and…electronically stimulates… Jones’ brain in a manner sufficient to produce a choice to vote for Gore at T2 (and subsequently cast a vote for Gore at T3)." (John Fischer, “Frankfurt-style Examples, Responsibility and Semi-compatibilism,” Free Will. Ed. Robert Kane. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2002, 93.)

Given that Black’s prior sign device ends up playing no role in Jones’ deliberations and final act of voting, since Jones opted to vote for Gore on his own without any actual interference from Black’s device, it seems that Jones votes freely and is responsible for voting for Gore, despite the fact that the presence of Black’s device eliminates the any alternative possibilities with regard to Jones’ choice and action about whom to vote for.

What is significant here is that Black does not intervene, b/c Jones happens to decide to vote his way, but Black's presence closes off alternate possibilities.

There is one obvious criticism here. Despite the initial appearance of no alternate possibilities, Jones in fact does have a limited alternate possibility, what Fischer calls a ‘flicker of freedom.’ I.e. Jones can still of exhibit a different neurological prior sign at T1, say a different neurologically pattern in his brain, than the one he did in Fischer and Frankfurt’s example. In other words, no matter what, it is always possible for Jones to display a different neurological sign right before Black intervenes.

Really though? Proponents of strong free will, as I presented it, are committed to saying that Jones is responsible for his decision in virtue of his ability to produce a different neurological firing pattern in his brain. This seems to stretch the credibility of our intuition that people are responsible for voluntarily acting on their own to the breaking point, because prima facie displaying a different, unconscious neural state does not look like a free, voluntary choice at all, especially if one stipulates specifies a Stumpian qualification (I called it this, because some philosopher named Elizabeth Stump I believe came up with this) where “if the firing of the whole neural sequence correlated with a mental act is not completed, the result is not…an incomplete mental act (say the beginning of a choice or decision)…[but] no mental act at all” (Fischer 103). On this construction, what kind of significant voluntary control could can agent possibly have over a neurological state, where if the neuron firing sequence is not completed a thought/mental event does not even occur?

The other main objection I see is claiming that it is logically impossible to have a full proof prior sign for Black. But, my aforementioned Stumpian qualification to the Frankfurt example circumvents this issue, as it allows for indeterminism at T0 (i.e. Jones’ complete set of beliefs and desires before going to the voting booth not being sufficient to vote one way or the other yet) or at T1 right up until Jones ends his deliberative process and chooses who he will vote for at T2. Yes, determinism has to ‘lock in’ after a certain point once the neural pathways start firing in a way that generates a decision of who to vote for, but that does not mean we cannot characterize the general state of affairs involved as indeterministic. It is a mistake to assume, because part of Jones’ deliberative process is determined, that the whole T0-T3 period has to be called deterministic. All such a criticism seems to indicate to me is that some versions of indeterminism rule out the tenability of Frankfurt-style examples, not all versions of indeterminism.

What this example shows is that freedom and morally responsibility don't necessarily come to the same thing. These types of examples though don't show that the strong free will version of 'could have done otherwise' is never correct, only that in certain circumstances (and somewhat outlandish ones at that) strong free will does not reliably ground moral responsibility.

I apologize if this post was overly technical and jargony. I had to write a paper basically on this very subject last semester in Metaphysics, so I'm drawing very heavily from that. I'll be happy to try and explain any unclear or vague terms I used.

Dostoevsky and Problems of Free Will

Feodor Dostoevsky writes, “will is a manifestation of all life, that is, of all human life including reason as well as all impulses. And although our life, in this manifestation of it, is often worthless…it is life nevertheless” (45). While free will certainly seems an ideal aspect of life, and one I think most believe themselves partakers in, I wonder if it really does constitute life, if free will is, moreover, necessary to life? Even if we are all subject to some greater order, directing all our courses in life, are we still not alive, and perhaps, not alive to a further degree? It seems that a greater kind of purpose, a greater sort of life is engendered when life is directed by fate, or “arithmetic,” as Dostoevsky calls it (47). In this life, every action has significance; life is not “worthless,” because it is part of a greater schematic, and therefore, seems a better kind of life than the one that Dostoevsky, sullenly, describes as “worthless” (45).

In any case, what is the difference between a fate-driven world in which people believe they have free choice but do not, and a world in which they veritably do have free choice? It seems to me that in either instance, man’s attitude towards the world is the same. Whether or not he is free, as defined by having free will or not, seems ultimately superfluous in that it does not determine his actions. Therefore, free will does not seem the essential element of life; it is not necessary, because the same sort of life, it seems, can exist with or without it. Some might say that this sort of life, one with a false sense of free will, is not real life, because our senses and attitudes are false. But by what do we have to judge life other than our senses, perceptions, and attitudes? If we perceive and reason the world a certain way, that seems enough justification to define it accordingly; these are the only parameters by which we can define the world and our lives in it.

Dostoevsky’s ideas, then, seem to conflict with others of the purpose of life, and what, specifically, constitutes life. It seems there is more to life than free will, because, it seems, the same kind of life can exist with or without free will. In my opinion, a life governed by an overarching purpose or schematic, seems far more appealing, far more assuring than a life “worthless,” but a “life nevertheless” (45). But in the end, regardless of appeal or assurance, Dostoevsky’s argument seems problematic for other, more substantive reasons.

Kierkegaard and God and Individuality

Suppose for a moment that the Absolute, in the words of Kierkegaard, had nothing to do with God, the Christian one for that matter. In my opinion, if Kierkegaard’s philosophy only applies to Christians and the Christian God, then what happens to all of the other individually aware non-Christians? I am fairly certain that most existentialist philosophers are hardly exclusive, or at least relatively so when compared to certain religious organizations (whether they practice more for public satisfaction than their own, private satisfaction is a whole other issue).

Take my case for example. I am not a very religious person, only because I need to understand more about who I am before I can understand who or what God and religion is. So here I am, a not-so religious nineteen-year-old who is neither an atheist nor agnostic (yet, who knows), listening to the philosophy of Kierkegaard which depends, if not solely, partially on the existence of God (and more narrowly, possibly a Christian God). Well, I happen to really appreciate and enjoy the three realms the philosopher presents: the aesthetic, ethical, and absolute. However, to modify Kierkegaard’s philosophy to meet my needs (which, to me, seems like the purpose of philosophy: to think about one’s beliefs and modify them to fit your own), the absolute no longer means God. Rather, the absolute to me seems to be more logically a complete self-understanding, to understand everything physical and mental about ourselves, and even the things we don’t even know we’re capable of yet.

So, why is it then, that Kierkegaard delegates the personal, individual aspect of, well, individuality to be more of an absolute aspect rather than an aesthetic one? Perhaps it is for the very reason that I have already mentioned: that in order to even understand the concept of God, you must first understand yourself. Maybe then, Kierkegaard’s argument of “watered-down” Christianity stands to say that generally speaking, “public” Christians need to step back from the safety blanket that is life after death, and begin to understand themselves. Perhaps then, with self-knowledge will then come the ability to really “get” religion, or at least the concept of it. For me anyway, Christianity these days is more about “being seen in church” than it is about private salvation and inner faith, and that might be why I have so much trouble delving into the Christian realm of believing in a God that would ask a man to kill his own son.

Presuppositions of Existentialism?

Perhaps I am not familiar enough with the school, but it seems to me that there may be an underlying presupposition to existentialist thought that I would like to examine. Why is the individual more important than the collective? Why is it important that we are free? Are we so sure that meaning must be created and not found? It seems that some people may, in their eagerness to rid themselves of Hegel and his System, swung to the opposite extreme and not considered the reasons for the assumptions that they make. Then again, perhaps I am simply missing an obvious point, or I have yet to come across it. I would appreciate any clarification.

I do, as a matter of fact, think that the individual is more important than the government, or the state, or most collective groups, because it is my belief that the individual will exist forever, and to the life of a single soul the history of states is a passing dream, but I would not be so quick to discount all collective interests. For me, the Christian church would be an instance in which sometimes (and perhaps many times) the interests or desires of an individual should be subjugated to that of the collective. Personal autonomy may be a good thing, but it is not the only thing, and our freedom is not for me our highest good.

But again, I have an extremely limited knowledge of existentialist thought, and would appreciate correction.

God Told Me To

In class we discussed the idea that one should do something if God tells one to do it. This is due to the fact that God is the absolute authority, trumping the universal (laws and morals) and the single individual. Now this was all fine and dandy in the times of the Bible when if one claimed to have been spoken to by God then everyone else would sit in awe and believe what had been said. Back then it didn’t matter what God had ordered (as we can see from the story of Abraham) all would believe; today, however, it just simply isn’t that easy. Now it seems we have a new standard that appears to be “It is possible God spoke to you, but only if he told you to do something plausible or clearly good”. In modern society there are plenty of cases of people killing other people and declaring that God told them to do so, however, I believe it is safe to say that not a single person believes them. On the other hand, if I were to drop everything and dedicate my life to helping those less fortunate than myself, and stated that God spoke to me and told me to do so, some people, maybe even many, would find this easy to swallow and go on with their day. It now appears we have a double standard that is easiest to attribute to a loss of faith, however, it can also be attributed to the individual’s belief that they know better than the next man or woman. In some respects this is the result of the alienation that is experienced in modern society coupled with the self-centered view of the world that is so widely held by the individual today. This distrust of everyone we do not know leads us to question everything that is even slightly doubtable; everyone we don’t know is a liar who is not to be trusted, when, most probably, they are people just like you and your friends and family. So if someone today were to come out into the street and proclaim themselves as the second coming of Christ, everyone around this person would laugh at them and wouldn’t even consider it a possibility, when in fact all of Christianity is waiting for the second coming. Nothing is taken at face value anymore, unless there is an established connection between two people interacting. This leads one to the possibility that Christianity was designed to keep people from questioning what they were told in order to control them. So has our society evolved to no longer need beliefs and doctrines such as Christianity? After all, we do now have laws in place to guide people the right way and if Christianity was only established as a system of laws to help govern people, that means there are people in society trying to follow two different doctrines, that of the Bible and that of the law, which can only lead to conundrums and double standards, like the double standard I started with. An example of religion acting to guide people is that of Judaism’s laws of kashrut which are the dietary laws of the religion. The things that are not allowed to be eaten include bottom-feeder fish and pork, both of which are considered to be dirty, suggesting that they were included in the laws of the faith to keep people healthy. So what if clean pork is available today, guaranteed not to make one sick? It most certainly is, so why are these laws still in effect in the faith? Is it possible that in the past the only way to get the masses to organize and govern themselves was to pass laws down from the “absolute” with the threat of punishment which cannot be seen in this lifetime? Now that we are able to make ethical or universal laws, is religion or the idea of the absolute still needed?

I really enjoyed our end of class discussion the other day, that sent everyone out with the questions: "How invested are you in making your life easier? How much are you willing to limit your belief in possibility?" I found an interesting new article (linked....here!...if you want...http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/education/8243684.stm) that brought this into an interesting focus in regards to how teachers view the potential of their students, and its effects on education.

Just running on this educational focus for a little, I've heard a rumor that applicants applying to Teach for America are asked the question "Do you think a teacher alone can help a student succeed?" This seems a very Kierkegaardian question in regards to the limiting of possibilities. TFA wants teachers who sincerely believe that all students have the potential to be other than what they are at face value -- poor students,in poor schools, from low income families, with statistically poor chances of doing well in the classroom -- and not teachers who have already formed assumptions and blocked off possibilities on how much their students will be able to achieve. Even though this is just what I've heard, and probably not true then, if the teacher candidate answers the question up above saying "No, I think that educational environment, family, home-life,...are all very important to a student's education as well" the result is that they will not get a position.

More generally, while I understand Kierkegaard's claim that limiting our expectations of other people's possibilities is in a way limiting their freedom to become anything other than we expect them to be, I wonder at what point our subjective truths become objective, or when it is ok to assume possibilities closed.
What are the benefits of allowing everyone we meet the possibilities that they could be or become an infinite number of things, when doing so only increases our anxiety? Unlike TFA, that encourages teachers to look for the best in all of the students, actually being open to all possibilities would mean assuming people could be better than we think they are, but also recognizing that everything might be worse than we can imagine. How much hope would this give to a TFA teacher, though? In their case,if that evaluation question is true, the teachers are people who are encouraged to only think the best, and deny themselves the possibility of the worst, which I think is denying a lot.

For example, if I am going to let myself believe in possibility, I would have as much reason to believe that the people I see could kill me as they could be my friends, could yell at me or pass me by completely. This would provide good reason to be anxious, if these are the possibilities that exist. An alternative might be the middle approach of accepting people as they are without passing any judgment or being anxious, which isn't an alternative that existentialism would be 100% happy with admitting as it rubs against the idea that everyone has the possibility to be anything.

I guess my problem with the idea of opening ourselves up to possibilities, to anxiety, is that the freedom it signifies sounds like a good thing, but it comes at a miserable cost. Opening up to possibilities seems to take away from prospects for happiness, leaving a person warily approaching life conscious that any given moment or person could be either kind or dangerous. Why would anyone want to think of these possibilities, if by instead of denying possibilities to others they may misjudge people entirely, either with good or bad results, but have a lot to gain as far as preserving their personal happiness and well being is concerned? It also seems like the individual who truly accepted the call to be open to all possibilities in others would be the quintessential individual. Anxious, not knowing what to expect of the people and world around them, they would also be very alone since the only thing they could really know and not be anxious about would be their own individuality and nothing else.

Second Interpretation of Abraham Story

The discussion in class has made me think about the way Kierkegaard has interpreted the story of Abraham and Isaac. I think that one can interpret the story entirely in the realm of the ethical.

First of all, within the ethical realm there are some ethical principles that can trump others. For example, we are all taught as children not to lie. However, imagine you are hiding a Jewish friend and a Nazi asks if there is anyone in the house besides your family. It is obvious that the right thing to do is to lie to protect your friend.

Therefore, the moral of the Abraham story could be that whatever God says trumps or overrules any other moral law. Moral law states that it is important to help people, more important not to hurt people, and most important not to kill people. However, the purpose of this story could be to show that whatever God says overrules any other law. (Because clearly not everyone accepts this claim, we will say it is part of the Christian ethical realm).

I think that this interpretation still makes the Abraham story as disturbing as the Kierkegaard interpretation: God could command someone to steal, murder, or any number of awful tasks. However, I do not think that the Abraham story is an idiosyncratic event.

If God had said "squiggle" and Abraham had responded by jumping up and down for two days: that would be idiosyncratic. That story is completely meaningless and I am not able to understand it. However, one can understand what Abraham was asked to do and why it was difficult because this story is within the realm of the ethical.

Kierkegaard might respond by saying that Abraham was completely alone in his experience: that no one would believe he was sane or say that what he did was right. However, this "aloneness" is dependent on the fact that only Abraham heard God's commandment to kill Isaac. If a Christian was on the jury deciding whether to punish a man who had performed Abraham's task, he/she would be forced to punish the man because there is no proof of God's commandment. However, if a Christian (who believed that God's laws could trump other ethical laws) was asked by God to perform Abraham's task, then the Christian would take that commandment as the highest ethical law. In the same way, a mother might punish her child for lying but that does not mean that the child had to go beyond the ethical to find a reason for lying within the ethical.

I had just been thinking about this today and was wondering what everyone else thought about it.

Conference on "Philosophy for Children" at the Univ. of Memphis

This weekend (Friday, September 11-Saturday, September 12), the University of Memphis Philosophy Department will be hosting a conference entitled Keeping the Child in Mind: A Conference about Philosophy for Children. (You can read more about the conference and see a schedule of speakers and topics by clicking that link.)

Here's a short description:
Philosophy is often thought to be an arcane subject, suitable only for adults. The idea that children can engage in philosophical reflection conflicts with a long-standing view that children are "emotional," "appetitive," and "irrational." There is a growing consensus among philosophers and educators, however, that children are natural philosophers. Their abundant curiosity, their propensity for asking questions, and their flexible minds, predispose them toward philosophical questions. With adequate encouragement and a student centered curriculum, they can develop the critical thinking skills characteristic of philosophic thought and move from mere consumers of information to reflective and autonomous thinkers.

The goal of Keeping the Child in Mind: A Conference About Philosophy for Children is to stimulate discussion of the theory and practice of Philosophy for Children and, in turn, to develop effective ways to introduce philosophy into pre-college classrooms in Memphis.

The Philosophy Department at the University of Memphis also runs a program called "Philosophical Horizons" that has been introducing philosophy to students in Memphis city schools.

All students are encouraged to attend the conference this weekend.

Self

Our brief discussion on the topic of self and identity the other day has really stuck with me. A concept as routine as this surely wouldn’t present a whole lot of problems in discussion, right? (sorry for the irrelevance to kierkegaard, just wanted to throw this out there.)

As college students we are all, or at least have once been pretty much obsessed with our identity. We are all striving to fill or even become certain criteria. High school, for example, encourages the individual to do things like join clubs and make good grades, for the purpose of developing a veritable identity that may be written down and either rejected or accepted. Students are urged to participate in order to gain membership in groups, whether it’s the soccer team, the debate club, or eventually college. The same trend exists within college as well. We are all striving to be someTHING, whether its a doctor, or a business woman, or even a philosopher. But when asked who you are, does one simply answer with their respective list? Can one really summarize oneself with what basically amounts to a job application? After all, it is theirs, is it not? Even on a less formal level, such as shared interests or hobbies, they don’t necessarily represent who we are. I know that I can’t be summed up by my involvement in the track team. I hope that I’m more interesting than that. As Dr. J argued in class, it is an insufficient description of self to merely attach oneself to a group. One has an identity before they join a fraternity or the basketball team, don’t they? I’m pretty confident that I had a valid identity before I started running track in ninth grade. It is also insufficient to rely on measuring self in facticity. That is, physical characteristics or facts are an inadequate representation of self. Something that is so peripheral must ultimately have minimal effect on ones’ self.

So how do we express (or even achieve) self-conciseness? It seems that our language doesn’t even allow for this. I know that, given the restrictions that I’ve set forth, I couldn’t explain just who I am. I couldn’t sit here and put myself onto a blog, only my thoughts and ideas that maybe express who I am. Perhaps that is the answer; our ideas and beliefs make us who we are. Maybe it is our creativity, our willingness to change, and our wisdom that define us. It would seem then, that ones’ “who” is not to be told or explained, but rather shown.